The Different Intentions Doctrine

General saving provisions, like Section 159A of the Customs Act, 1962, serve as default mechanisms to ensure legal continuity and prevent a legal vacuum when rules are repealed. Section 159A generally stipulates that amendments, repeals, or rescissions of rules shall not affect previous operations, actions done, or any rights, obligations, or liabilities acquired under the repealed rule. It also generally saves investigations or legal proceedings concerning such matters. However, this comprehensive saving is qualified by the phrase: "unless a different intention appears". This pivotal phrase allows the legislature to explicitly or implicitly signal that general savings do not apply or apply in a modified way to a particular repeal. Section 159A creates a rebuttable presumption of continuity, acting as a default safety net, but the legislature can override it through a "different intention".

In contrast, specific saving provisions are specifically tailored to the legislation being repealed. Rule 20 of the Drawback Rules, 2017, titled "Repeal and saving," is the specific saving clause central to the Famina Knit Fabs case. Rule 20 states that the 1995 Rules cease to operate from the commencement of the 2017 Rules. Importantly, sub-rule (2) enumerates specific circumstances and types of proceedings under the 1995 Rules that are saved and are to be disposed of according to the repealed 1995 Rules.

The act of drafting and incorporating a detailed, itemised specific saving clause like Rule 20(2) strongly suggests a legislative intent to move beyond mere reliance on general saving provisions. It implies a deliberate process of curating a bespoke list of what survives the repeal. If the legislature intended the general saving clause (Section 159A) to apply comprehensively, a detailed and limited specific saving clause like Rule 20(2) would appear redundant. When such a specific clause meticulously lists certain items to be saved, it points towards a conscious selection. This selection inherently suggests that items not included in this specific enumeration might be intentionally excluded from being saved, thereby indicating an intention that differs from a blanket application of general savings.

A well-established principle of statutory interpretation is that a specific provision dealing with a particular subject matter may take precedence over a more general provision. The High Court's reasoning in Famina Knit Fabs aligns with this, finding that the "different intention" manifested in the specific wording of Rule 20 of the 2017 Rules was to be given precedence, limiting the operational scope of Section 159A. The Court referred to precedents like Hindustan Construction Company Ltd, which was upheld by the Supreme Court, affirming that a specific saving clause dictates the extent of what is saved, potentially ousting general saving clauses (like Section 6 of the General Clauses Act or Section 159A) for matters not covered by the specific saving. This hierarchical interpretation reflects judicial deference to the legislature's presumed precision; explicit words in specific legislation are considered a more accurate expression of intent than a general statement.

Judicial Interpretation of "Different Intention" in Rule 20 The High Court meticulously examined Rule 20(2) of the 2017 Rules to discern legislative intent.

• Rule 20(2)(a) saves applications by manufacturers/exporters for determination/revision of drawback rates for goods exported before the 2017 Rules, if not disposed of, directing their disposal under the 1995 Rules.

• Rule 20(2)(b) saves claims by exporters for payment of drawback for goods exported before the 2017 Rules, if not disposed of, also to be disposed of under the 1995 Rules.

• Rule 20(2)(c) states that drawback rates/amounts determined under the 1995 Rules cease to operate for goods exported on or after the 2017 Rules' commencement.

A crucial observation made by the Court was that "none of clause deal with drawback claims filed and sanctioned prior to 1.10.2017". This was pivotal because actions to recover drawback already paid and settled under the 1995 Rules were not explicitly included in the saved categories. The language of Rule 20(2)(a) and (b) focuses on exporter-initiated processes (applications for determination/revision and claims for payment) pending at the time of repeal. There is a conspicuous absence of any clause explicitly saving department-initiated recovery proceedings for drawback already processed, sanctioned, and paid under the 1995 Rules (e.g., proceedings under Rule 16 of the 1995 Rules).

This omission was viewed by the Court not as accidental but as a significant indicator forming the bedrock of the "different intention". The Court reasoned that if the legislature had intended to save ongoing or future departmental actions to recover already disbursed drawback, they could easily have included language to that effect. The absence of such phrasing, contrasted with the specificity of what is saved, became highly significant, pointing towards a deliberate exclusion.

Based on this, the High Court articulated its rationale: "By saving few rights accrued under Drawback Rules, 1995 Government has expressed different intention so Section 159A of 1962 Act becomes inapplicable". The Court further reasoned that "Had there been intention to save all rights and liabilities arising from Drawback Rules, 1995, the Government would not have inserted Rule 20(2) in Drawback Rules, 2017 saving only few rights/acts". This underscores the Court's view that the limited and specific enumeration in Rule 20(2) is, in itself, the evidence of the "different intention" that displaces the general saving provision. The Court also dismissed the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence's (DRI) argument that a pending investigation meant the petitioner's claim was "pending" and thus saved by Rule 20(2)(b), clarifying that Rule 20(2)(b) saves an exporter's pending claim for payment, not a departmental investigation into past payments.

The Court effectively established a direct causal link: the act of specifying a limited list of saved items in Rule 20(2) is the cause for the "different intention" to manifest. This manifestation activates the exception in Section 159A ("unless a different intention appears"). Consequently, Section 159A's broader saving powers do not extend to those rights, obligations, or proceedings (such as the recovery of already paid drawback under Rule 16 of the 1995 Rules) that were omitted from the specific list in Rule 20(2).

The judgment unequivocally states: "As there is specific Rule 20 in Drawback Rules, 2017 saving few rights accrued/created under Drawback Rules, 1995, Section 159A of 1962 Act cannot come into play and we are bound to look into different clauses of Rule 20 to find out that to which extent erstwhile rights and liabilities arising out of Drawback Rules, 1995 are saved". The Court drew strong parallels with the Hindustan Construction Company case, where the specific saving of "pending revisions" excluded the initiation of fresh revisions post-repeal. These precedents consistently show that specific savings define the precise boundaries of what survives a repeal. Any silence in a specific saving clause regarding a particular type of proceeding or right is likely interpreted as an intentional legislative decision not to save it via that clause, thus ousting the general saving clause for that matter due to the "different intention" expressed by the omission. The principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of others) appears a powerful tool here.

While Section 159A would generally save pending applications/claims for drawback determination/payment and recovery of already paid drawback, Rule 20(2) specifically saves only pending applications for determination/revision and pending claims for payment by the exporter. Crucially, Rule 20(2) is silent on the recovery of drawback already paid, particularly where the SCN is issued post-commencement of the 2017 Rules. This silence, the Court held, is the "different intention". Because Rule 20(2) does not save such recovery proceedings, Section 159A cannot be invoked to save them; the specific, limited list in Rule 20(2) ousts the general saving for this unlisted matter. Similarly, Rule 20(2)(c) expressly defines the cut-off for old rates, showing a clear "different intention" to terminate them for future exports. For other rights/liabilities not specified in Rule 20(2), the silence in Rule 20 is presumed not to save them, and the "different intention" manifested by the selective list in Rule 20(2) displaces Section 159A's general protection for these unspecified matters arising from the 1995 Rules.

Key Implications of the Judgment The most significant implication is that Show Cause Notices for the recovery of drawback already paid under the repealed 1995 Rules, such as the one under Rule 16, are not saved if they do not fall within the specific categories enumerated in Rule 20(2) of the 2017 Rules. The judgment explicitly states Rule 20(2) "does not save recovery proceedings of already paid duty drawback". Consequently, the Court concluded the respondent could not initiate or continue with the SCN issued under the 1995 Rules, leading to its quashing.

This interpretation has substantial ramifications for the Revenue department, potentially invalidating numerous similar SCNs issued after 1 October 2017, seeking recovery of drawback paid under the 1995 Rules where the matter was not a "pending claim for payment by the exporter" at the time of repeal. It underscores a potential lacuna in the saving clause regarding revenue recovery for past, settled drawback payments. Any other SCN sharing the same critical characteristics would be equally vulnerable to challenge.

The Court's reasoning regarding the exclusivity of Rule 20(2) extends beyond Rule 16 actions. It applies logically to any action or proceeding initiated under the repealed 1995 Rules if it does not squarely fit within the narrow confines of what is expressly saved by Rule 20(2)(a) or (b) (pending exporter applications/claims). This judgment provides assessees with a potent legal argument: any party facing a notice/demand initiated post-1 October 2017, purportedly under the 1995 Rules, must meticulously examine if their pending matter precisely matched the descriptions in Rule 20(2)(a) or (b). If not, the judgment offers a strong basis to challenge the notice's validity. The foundational logic is that Rule 20(2) acts as an exhaustive list for what is saved from the 1995 Rules due to the "different intention" it signals. Therefore, if a particular departmental action or an exporter's unresolved issue under the 1995 Rules does not align with the specific types of pending matters enumerated in Rule 20(2), it is implicitly not saved by Rule 20. The precise factual status and nature of any "pending" issue as of the repeal date (1 October 2017) are absolutely critical for determining its survivability.

The judgment reinforces a crucial interpretive principle: when a repealing statute includes a specific, detailed saving clause, reliance on broader, general saving clauses (like Section 159A or Section 6 of the General Clauses Act) becomes precarious for matters not covered by that specific clause. The threshold for successfully arguing that a "different intention" has not been expressed becomes significantly higher when such a detailed specific clause is present. Legislative drafters must recognise that courts are likely to interpret detailed but limited specific saving clauses as a deliberate legislative choice to exclude what is not mentioned. This interpretation effectively means the specific clause is seen as occupying the field for savings under that particular repeal, thereby ousting general saving provisions for unmentioned matters. If a broader saving is intended alongside specific enumerations, this intent needs to be made unequivocally clear in the statutory language.

A direct corollary is the highlighted need for legislatures to draft saving clauses with utmost clarity and comprehensiveness. This is critical if the intent is to preserve a wide array of rights, obligations, or ongoing proceedings. If specific enumerated savings are meant to coexist with the broader applicability of general saving provisions for unenumerated matters, this dual intent should be explicitly articulated to avoid interpretations like in Famina Knit Fabs. The judgment exposes a potential gap where legislative intent (assuming it was to continue recovery actions) was not adequately translated into the text of Rule 20(2). The outcome might not have been what the executive or legislature intended, but courts interpret the law as written. If the text of Rule 20(2) doesn't save such actions, and its specificity signals a "different intention" ousting general savings, that is the legal consequence. The onus is on the legislature to be precise and exhaustive in its saving clauses if it wishes to ensure the continuity of all desired elements from a repealed regime.

Concluding Analysis The High Court's analysis in Famina Knit Fabs is fundamentally an exercise in discerning legislative intent from the specific textual choices made in Rule 20. This aligns with the tenet of statutory interpretation that the objective is to ascertain and apply the will of the legislature. In this instance, the explicit and limited text of the specific saving clause was deemed the most decisive indicator of intent regarding the scope of savings.

The judgment implicitly offers a clear analytical pathway for assessing the survivability of actions post-repeal:

1. Meticulously examine any specific saving clause in the new legislation.

2. Analyse the precise scope of this specific saving clause to see what it explicitly preserves.

3. Determine if the action in question squarely falls within these explicitly saved categories.

4. If it does not, assess whether the specific clause's nature and wording (e.g., its limited enumeration) indicate a "different intention" that precludes reliance on general saving provisions for the unlisted matter. The Famina Knit Fabs judgment strongly suggests that such a limited, specific list is evidence of such "different intention".

This approach prioritises the legislature's most direct statement on savings related to the specific repealed law, preventing over-reliance on general saving clauses that might not reflect nuanced intentions in a particular repeal. The ruling by the Punjab and Haryana High Court could solidify the principle that detailed, specific saving clauses are often read as exhaustive concerning the matters they explicitly address, defining the full extent of what is saved and limiting the applicability of general saving provisions for unlisted matters. This judgment contributes to jurisprudence by emphasising that the "different intention" required to oust a general saving clause can be inferred from the structure, content, and selectivity of the specific saving clause itself; it doesn't necessarily require an explicit legislative statement. The act of specific, limited enumeration can itself be the "different intention". This case provides a clear judicial articulation of how "different intention" is identified and its consequences, potentially influencing how courts approach similar repeal scenarios. It highlights that the legislature "speaks" not only by what it includes but also by what it omits from a specific list in certain contexts.